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Counsel’s tables? Seating counsel and
litigants-in-person in the courtroom
Dr Bridgette Toy-Cronin, University of Otago, with some practical
suggestions
W
here should litigants-in-person (LiPs) sit in the
courtroom? Do they have a right to sit at “coun-
sel’s tables” or do they need leave? Why have
certain practices developed in this regard and why do they
matter? These questions emerged from court observations
during research on LiPs in the New Zealand civil courts
(Bridgette Toy-Cronin “Keeping Up Appearances: Accessing
New Zealand’s Civil Courts as a Litigant in Person” (PhD
Thesis, University of Otago, 2015)). This article reports the
findings about practice in the High Court and Family Court
and examines them in a procedural, historical and social
context. It concludes that current practice needs reform to
create greater consistency and avoid messages of exclusion
that may undermine the legitimacy of the court.
METHOD
In the research from which this article draws, I examined
litigation in person in the Family, District and High Courts
(the research was concluded on the eve of the 2014 family
justice reforms). I used several qualitative methods: inter-
views, analysing litigation documents, and observing court
proceedings. The research participants included LiPs (34),
court staff (8), lawyers (16) and judges (13). LiPs were
current litigants or litigants with cases concluded within the
previous year. They participated in one of two different ways:
either by way of an interview only or by way of a more
comprehensive case study. The case study included multiple
interviews, ongoing review of case-related correspondence
and documents, and where possible, observation of the LiP in
court. The judges, lawyers and court staff all participated by
way of an interview. This article considers seating arrange-
ments in the Family and High Courts as observed or dis-
cussed in interviews.
CURRENT PRACTICE
Case management and other lists
For many litigants the first interaction with the court in their
case is a judicial mention in a list. Lists are often very busy
with anywhere between three and 20 cases being called
depending on the court. The judge sits in court with the
lawyers for the first case, and often many other lawyers for
parties on the remainder of the list (lawyers will often have
multiple clients on the same list). The court taker calls each
case on the list, the lawyers announce their appearances, and
then a discussion about the case begins, led by the judge.
The Family Court is not a public forum, so LiPs are not
allowed to sit in the court while the list is called, but lawyers
are bound by their professional obligations to maintain
confidentiality, so can remain. The courtroom may be full,
with all the counsel’s tables occupied and some lawyers
seated in the public gallery. LiPs are then called into the
courtroom when their case is called, to be confronted by a
courtroom full of lawyers. A Family Court Judge said a LiP
had recently objected to this practice:
One litigant came in and said “I don’t like this. I feel
you’re all sitting here like a club”, which would be a
reasonable, fair assumption and that is bad for business
for people to feel like that. We shouldn’t allow that to
occur.
The Judge said this “might need to be engineered out of the
process” by excluding all lawyers and parties from the court-
room. Then parties and lawyers would come in as their cases
were called. The difficulty was efficiency. If each case was
called individually and the litigants had to come in and sit
down with lawyers that would “halve your throughput”
because there would always be the “human factor” of being
unable to find one of the parties at the crucial moment. It
would also reduce the opportunity for lawyers to improve
their practice by observing other lawyers making submis-
sions.
Many High Court lists do not involve sensitive matters, so
all lawyers and LiPs can be in the courtroom for the list. A
High Court LiP said that for a matter scheduled in a busy list,
he chose to appear without counsel because he was con-
cerned about having to pay “a barrister to sit around for 2–4
hours”. Although he had been in the Family Court previously
he found he was “… thrown off guard by this High Court
thing, cos they’ve got all the gowns”. He was unsure where to
sit and someone (he thought a lawyer) said, “Just sit here,
just sit here”, ushering him to a seat in the public gallery. The
opposing party was represented by a lawyer who was seated
at counsel’s tables. When the case was called the LiP remained
in the public gallery. The LiP said the Judge “… [didn’t] even
speak to me, he just [spoke] to the lawyer and I’m the
applicant”. The respondent’s lawyer made the submissions
and the High Court found that the security had lapsed so the
LiP became an unsecured creditor. In this case, the LiP felt the
appearance had both been procedurally and substantively
unfair.
Hearings
The issue of seating arrangements arises not only in lists but,
in the High Court, occurs at the beginning of interlocutory
applications and trials. On an interlocutory application, one
LiP encountered some confusion about where to sit:
I sort of went into the courtroom and put my stuff on the
table and [the opposing party’s lawyer] said, ‘You can’t
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stay here you know, that’s the bar there. That is, you have
to belong to the bar before you can’. I said, ‘That is fine,
that’s fine’, so I went back and sat in the public gallery.
And [the Judge] said, ‘Come on up’.
The LiP was amused, feeling he had one up on the lawyer. On
the first morning of the LiP’s trial, he set up his many books
and papers at counsel’s table. It was a multi-day trial with a
large amount of documentary material. Court begins at 10
am. I was surprised when at 9:53 am he came to sit in the
public gallery where I was observing. I asked him why he was
in the public gallery and he said the court taker had told him
to sit there until the Judge gave him leave to sit at counsel’s
tables. This requirement seemed symbolic only, as there is no
possibility that a multiday trial could be conducted with one
party in the public gallery. At 9:58 am the court taker came
and told him the Judge said he could sit at counsel’s tables.
The High Court judges expressed various positions on the
issue of seating. Some thought that LiPs sat in the public
gallery because they were unsure where to sit, it being human
nature to hang back in unfamiliar situations. Another said:
Our court takers always ensure they sit at the back and I
invite them to come and sit up at the front, at counsel’s
table … It is just courtesy. They are not entitled to be
seated on counsel’s benches because they are not counsel,
but because they are appearing for themselves, they are
being heard, we allow them in.
Another Judge said that the court takers probably told them
to sit in the public gallery because they do not have a right of
audience without leave, but was unsure if that was the case or
not.
The practice has led to some uncomfortable moments in
court. The following interchange occurred at the beginning
of a pre-trial call-over and arose from well-meant advice
from a senior barrister that the LiP should request leave to sit
at counsel’s tables before beginning his submissions:
(Case is called and LiP, seated at counsel’s tables, rises to
his feet)
LiP: (Standing) Excuse me Your Honour I’m Mr [LiP] and
I’m self-represented. I spoke to a barrister and he said—
Judge: Would you please pause. (LiP continues to stand
and opens his mouth to speak, looks rapidly around the
courtroom and back to the Judge). We need to see if there
is anyone here for [Respondent]?
Respondent’s lawyer: (Standing) Miss [Lawyer] for [Respon-
dent] (Sits).
Judge: Thank you. Yes Mr [LiP].
LiP: I spoke to a barrister here in town and he advised me
to ask permission to sit at the bench.
Judge: (laughing, kindly) You mean counsel’s tables. I’m
at the bench.
LiP: (laughing) Yes, as a matter of courtesy he said that I
should ask permission to sit here, at the table.
Judge: Yes that is fine.
DISCUSSION
Other than causing awkwardness, seating difficulties also
caused some LiPs to feel they had been treated unfairly. So
what justifications do these practices have and should they be
amended?
Historical perspective
The idea that LiPs need leave to sit before the bar does not
hold up to historical examination. In the early history of the
courts, all litigants were required to appear in person and
present their case in their own words: the outcome of the case
turned on the litigant’s exact words and the notion of agency
had not yet developed (Frederick Pollock and Frederic Will-
iam Maitland The History of English Law: Before the time of
Edward I (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1911) at 211). The idea of a legal representative, someone
who stood as the litigant’s agent before the court, evolved
throughout the 12th and 13th centuries and by the reign of
Edward I (1272–1307) the legal profession as we know it
today had begun to take shape (Pollock and Maitland,
at 215). The rule that only approved practitioners (such as
attorneys, serjeants and barristers) have a right of audience
before the court had emerged (Duncan Webb “The Right
Not to Have a Lawyer” (2007) 16 Journal of Judicial Admin-
istration 165 at n 45). The legal profession’s evolution and its
monopolisation of the courts was so rapid that, while litigat-
ing in person had previously been mandatory, in 1259 the
King felt it necessary to reinstate the right to litigate in person
by decree (with the exception of pleas of the Crown, pleas of
land and pleas of unlawful distraint) (Pollock and Maitland,
at 217).
The right to appear in person has been retained since the
reception of English law into New Zealand. The current
legislation sets out the general rule that it is an offence for
someone other than a lawyer to appear “as an advocate for
any person” or represent “any other person … in proceed-
ings before any New Zealand court or tribunal” (Lawyers
and Conveyancers Act 2006, s 24). The right to litigate in
person is retained however as the law “do[es] not prevent any
person from representing himself or herself in proceedings
before any court or tribunal” (Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act 2006, s 27(1)(a)).
While litigating in person has always been a protected
right, the courtroom itself has historically been a contested
zone. Courtroom architecture evolved, with increasing seg-
regation of participants and portioned zones “as a result of
turf wars about who can legitimately participate on the legal
stageandtherespectwhichshouldbeaffordedthem”(LindaMulcahy
Legal Architecture: Justice, Due Process and the Place of
Law (Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, Online, 2010) at 39).
Lawyers and clients originally occupied the same space behind
the large table for the clerks and in front of the area reserved
for spectators. As lawyers’ role grew, they came to sit at the
clerks’ table and then at a table of their own, with the clerks’
table reduced in size (Mulcahy (2010) at 46).
I have found no contemporary rule that states LiPs need
leave. The only written guidance I have found on the subject
of where LiPs can sit in the courtroom is a two-page docu-
ment, which at the time of the research, was the Ministry of
Justice’s only official advice to LiPs. It was unhelpfully drafted
in the passive voice and said only, “You will be shown where
to sit when the case is called” (Ministry of Justice “Memo-
randum for Unrepresented Civil Litigants” (undated, no
longer available online, on file with the author)). The new
guide for LiPs, since introduced, is much more comprehen-
sive, but is silent on the topic of where to sit (Ministry of
Justice“RepresentingYourself intheHighCourtofNewZealand”
(undated) <www.justice.govt.nz>). The “Guide for Self-
Represented Litigants in the Victorian County Court” is
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more specific and advises LiPs to sit “in the body of the Court
in the front row nearest the bar”. It goes on to advise that
once the case is called then: “[t]he Judge will ask your name
and confirm you are representing yourself. You may be
allowed to sit at the bar table with the other representatives,
however, you should not sit there until the Judge has said that
you may” (County Court Victoria “A Guide for Self-
Represented Litigants in the Civil Jurisdiction of the County
Court” (2011) <www.countycourt.vic.gov.au>).
It appears that the evolving segregation of courts has
resulted in LiPs, in New Zealand and parts of Australia,
erroneously being equated with the “public” and excluded
from the central area of the court unless they are granted
leave.
Inclusion and exclusion in the courtroom
The practice of requiring LiPs to remain in the public gallery,
or to seek leave to sit at counsel’s table, can be seen as a
political act that signals in a very direct, physical sense the
LiP’s “outsider” status. Mulcahy argues that, while lawyers
look on the space within the court “as a depoliticized sur-
face” (Linda Mulcahy “Architects of Justice: the Politics of
Courtroom Design” (2007) 16 Social and Legal Studies 383
at 385–386):
Each time a partition is created or bar installed in a court
it has the effect of creating an inside and outside; an
‘opposition’ or other which can serve to signal segrega-
tion, place or inequality. Each time a floor is raised it has
the potential to become the physical manifestation of
hierarchy and power. When a royal coat of arms is placed
behind a judge’s chair it makes clear that the full authority
of the state and legitimate force is behind the judge … Seen
in this way the space in a courtroom becomes a particular
articulation of social, cultural and legal relations.
The practice of policing access to counsel’s tables communi-
cates to LiPs that they are not welcome.
One explanation for communicating this message is sim-
ply that LiPs are perceived to create what Zuckerman terms
an “efficiency deficit” (Adrian Zuckerman “No Justice With-
out Lawyers: The Myth of an Inquisitorial System” (2014)
33 Civil Justice Quarterly 355 at 355). That is, ensuring a
just outcome when an LiP is involved, in both the substantive
and procedural sense, is time-consuming because LiPs are
perceived to need more time and assistance. Their presence in
court therefore creates additional expense to both the court
and opposing party. Excluding them from counsel’s benches
without leave reinforces their outsider status and may dis-
courage them from coming to court unmediated by a lawyer.
Once a lawyer is present, the “efficiency deficit” theoretically
disappears.
Discouraging LiPs also means that opposing counsel and
judges are not exposed to strain on their roles. The presence
of LiPs puts opposing counsel’s role as advocate for the
opposing party under strain because they are forced to make
decisions about how much assistance to lend LiPs to ensure
the hearing goes smoothly (both for their client and in
discharging their duties as officers of the court). The role of
the Judge as neutral arbiter is also strained by LiPs, as they
must decide how much assistance to give the LiP in pursuit of
a procedurally and substantively just hearing, while remain-
ing a neutral arbiter. This tension was noted in my research
and has been documented in other studies (John Dewar,
Barry Smith and Cate Banks “Litigants in Person in the
Family Court of Australia” (report to the Family Court of
Australia, Research Report No 20, 2000) at 47–48; Richard
Moorhead “The Passive Arbiter: Litigants in Person and the
Challenge to Neutrality” (2007) 17 Social and Legal Studies
405; Kim Williams “Litigants in Person: A Literature Review”
(Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom, 2011) at 7). If LiPs are
successfully persuaded to seek representation, this strain
disappears and the judges and lawyers can remain within
their traditional adversarial roles.
Another explanation for excluding LiPs from counsel’s
benches is that judges and lawyers are protecting their pro-
fessional “patch”. This is not necessarily about protecting
their financial interests (I found no convincing evidence to
suggest that financial interests were a significant factor), but
about protecting professional identity. The courtroom is
what Abbott calls the “charismatic heartland” of the profes-
sion, the most publicly and professionally recognised aspect
of being a lawyer (Andrew Abbott “Status and Status Strain
in the Professions” (1981) 86(4) American Journal of Soci-
ology 819 at 831). Abbott cites, by way of example, the
“anachronistic rituals of moot court”, which law students
must participate in, despite few going on to have careers as
advocates, as a way in which the profession increases its
status by “[forcing] all careers to start in the charismatic
heartland” (at 831). The protection of the courtroom is
therefore particularly important to the protection of the legal
profession’s territory. As Webb has observed, lawyers “tend
to jealously guard the right to provide representation” (Webb,
above at 173). Requiring LiPs to have leave before they can
sit at counsel’s tables can be seen in this light as a form of
protecting the “heartland”; publicly marking the inner sanc-
tum of the courtroom as belonging to the legal profession.
Whether or not the practice has emerged to discourage
litigation in person, and whether or not it is motivated by
efficiency or by protecting the profession, the consequence of
messages of exclusion may be grave. Procedural justice theory
suggests that messages of exclusion, even subtle ones, affect
people’s perceptions of justice, even if the outcome of the
process is favourable for the litigant. Discouraging access in
some senses protects the court process by minimising the
“efficiency deficit”, but also risks the court’s legitimacy by
suggesting to LiPs that they are excluded because they are not
part of “the club”. As the Family Court Judge said, “that is
bad for business”. Tyler’s conclusion in his seminal book,
Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 2006), would support that Judge’s observation: if
people perceive they have been treated unfairly they will be
less willing to defer to the courts’ authority. That can only be
“bad for business”.
THOUGHTS ON REFORM
At present, the seating and spaces in courtrooms are oriented
towards lawyers. LiPs are, particularly in the High Court,
equated with “the public”, rather than recognised as parties
with standing before the court as of right. If the focus is
placed on litigants having a right of audience — a right they
always had and continue to have — then “counsel’s tables”
can be reconceived as the “parties’ tables”. They are pro-
vided so parties to a proceeding can make organised and
audible submissions to the Judge — either in person or
through a lawyer. The question of who sits at the table is then
simply a question of whether that right will be exercised by
an agent with a right of audience (the lawyer) or by the
litigant in person.
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The issue with seating during lists in the Family Court can
legitimately take into account the need for efficiency; this is
one of the goals of the system and benefits both the parties
and the public at large. The problem with appearing to be a
“club” could be somewhat remedied by having an allocated
seat at a table for LiPs in the Family Court, so any LiP
entering the court for their case can be taken to that seat. This
would avoid LiPs uncomfortably hovering at the bar, or not
knowing where to sit, and mean that, at least for their matter,
they are given equal standing with the lawyers.
The High Court should dispense with the practice of LiPs
requiring leave to be seated at counsel’s tables. It has no
historical or legal justification and the message of exclusion it
sends to LiPs risks undermining the legitimacy of the Court.
Undoing this practice will require education of registry staff.
Lawyers would also need to be aware of the policy as
evidence suggests they are sometimes policing LiPs’ access to
the bar tables.
In this way, a small but important message of exclusion
can be eliminated from our courts, sending the message that
the legal profession is there to serve the community, not to
protect the “club”. ❒
Continued from page 139
may not include an intentional application of force and may
not therefore include an assault … But an assault with intent
to commit sexual violation will always amount to an attempt
to sexually violate”. See also William Young J at [146]).
However, “the fact that attempted rape and assault with
intent to commit rape are dealt with in the same section may
indicate that Parliament considered that both should be
subject to the same restriction that the conduct involved must
be sufficiently proximate to the full offence” (SC at [72]. See
Elias CJ at [115]: “… equivalence in the requirement of
proximity is required on proper construction of s 129”). The
majority continued (SC at [73]):
But even if proximity is not required as a matter of law in
respect of offences under s 129(2) … without it, the
Crown will have difficulty in proving an intent to rape.
The need for the Crown to prove that there was such an
intent when the assault was committed means that gener-
ally there will have to be a close connection between
assault and the intended sexual intercourse (which will
often be sufficient to justify a conviction for an attempt if
attempt had been charged).
Thus (SC at [75]):
… as a practical matter, we think it likely that there will
have to be a reasonable proximity between the assault and
the intended sexual intercourse before the accused will be
convicted. This will significantly limit, if not eliminate,
the potential for over-reach.
Elias CJ also cautions against over-reach at [113], [141].
A POSTSCRIPT ON PROXIMITY
A final point worth a mention concerns the issue of over-
reach in the context of the general law of attempt. R v
Harpur [2010] NZCA 319, (2010) 24 CRNZ 909 is the
leading New Zealand case on attempt. There, on a charge of
attempted sexual violation, the Full Court of the Court of
Appeal held that s 72 permitted “the defendant’s conduct to
be considered in its entirety” (at [36]) with effect that “strong
evidence of intent [could] assist in assessing the significance
of acts done towards the commission of the intended offence”
(at [38]). Harpur overturned the earlier case of R v Wilcox
[1982] 1 NZLR 191 (CA) where the accused was charged
with attempted aggravated robbery of a post office. The
police stopped the car in which the accused was travelling
when it was still one kilometre from the post office. The
Court of Appeal held that the conduct was not proximate.
The Court had drawn a narrower line around what qualified
as proximate conduct, stressing that independent and careful
attention to mens rea and actus reus was particularly impor-
tant (at 193).
Harpur has introduced a more expansive approach to
proximity than that recognised in Wilcox and indeed other
jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom (recent English case
law has drawn a tighter boundary around what constitutes
an attempt; see, for example, R v Gullefer (1990) 91 Cr App
R 356 (CA); R v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 1057; R v Campbell
(1991) 93 Cr App R 350 (CA); R v Geddes (1996) 160 JP
679; [1996] Crim LR 894 (CA)). This was a point noted by
the Court in Ah-Chong. Significantly, the Supreme Court
does not conclusively endorse Harpur. The majority elected
to “express no view on which approach to proximity is to be
preferred” (SC at [72], n 63), and Elias CJ did “not want to
be taken to approve the approach … in R v Harpur …
without hearing argument in a case where it arises” (SC at
[121]).
The Supreme Court will get that opportunity later this
year when it considers Johnston v R [2015] NZSC 143
(successful application for leave to appeal against conviction
for attempted rape); Johnston v R [2012] NZCA 559, [2013]
2 NZLR 19 (CA), another case of attempted sexual viola-
tion. In Johnston the accused was found in the backyard of a
family home not far from a detached sleep-out where the
16-year-old complainant slept at night. The Court of Appeal
considered the issue was finely balanced, but agreed that the
accused’s acts (crouching in the backyard and the other
actions he had taken leading up to that point) amounted to
attempted sexual violation: Johnston CA at [28]. Any retreat
from the expansive view of proximity taken in Harpur would
no doubt assist in avoiding the “potential for over-reach”
that the Court warned of in Ah-Chong in the more specific
context of s 129(2). ❒
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